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ABSTRACT. The paper argues that negotiation costs can prevent the international com-
munity from finding a new international climate agreement. To define a feasible way of
facilitating the negotiation process, I analyze basic equity principles and their relation-
ship to climate policy and economic development. Based on the most relevant principles,
I propose a general synthetic rule for burden sharing in international climate policy. The
rule avoids complexity and comprises both egalitarian and cost-sharing aspects, which
appears to be crucial for achieving a climate agreement. Carbon budgets for the different
countries are calculated under different parameter assumptions.
1. Introduction
The task of reaching a new international climate agreement is difficult due
to specific conditions affecting costs and benefits of the different countries.
First, perceived costs of climate mitigation are substantial, because fossil
fuels are still widely used in most economies.1 This stands in sharp con-
trast to the successful Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer, where the costs
of protection were small (and the benefits were large). Second, the nega-
tive effects of climate change are unevenly distributed across the different
countries. Specifically, many low-developed countries are most vulnerable
to climate change due to their geographical location and dependence on
agriculture (see World Bank, 2010). Also, adaptation to changing climate
1 A survey of the costs according to 10 of the world’s leading integrated assessment
models is given in Clarke et al. (2009); for the costs in a fully dynamic model, see
Bretschger et al. (2011).
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conditions is relatively easier for high-developed economies because cap-
ital and knowledge are more abundant. Accordingly, not all the countries
are evenly concerned about climate change when acting in their own self-
interest.2 Third, as a matter of fact, the offer of side payments and the
credibility of threats to restrict trade with non-signatory parties is more
complex in the climate context than for other international frameworks.
In the literature on international environmental treaties, the search for
self-enforcing agreements has dominated (see Bosello et al., 2003; Barrett,
2005).3 There has been much consideration on how to build coalitions and
how to attract countries to join. Hence, it has been assumed that countries
can freely choose whether to be a signatory or a non-signatory. Moreover,
the costs of negotiating an international contract are usually disregarded.
However, following the Durban platform in 2011, the character of the inter-
national decision process for climate policy has changed substantially. On
the one hand, the international agreement has to be negotiated within a
very limited time period, so that the efficiency of negotiations and the
reduction of complexity become key. On the other hand, according to
the Durban climate agreement, the climate coalition is fixed, encompass-
ing the whole world community (see UNFCCC, 2011).4 If under the new
regime some countries choose to be a non-signatory the treaty fails. Note
that, given the confirmed target of a maximum warming of 2◦C, the total
budget for greenhouse gases should be determined by scientific results, so
that the new treaty will be primarily about the international distribution of
the burden of mitigation policies.5
The complexity of the negotiation issues, the asymmetric interest of
countries, the limited time available, and the necessity to have all countries
on board give rise to the concern that an agreement will not be possi-
ble because an acceptable proposition might not be finalized within the
2 It has even been argued that transfers from the North to the South are more
effective to help the South than climate mitigation (see Schelling, 1995); how-
ever, Bretschger and Suphaphiphat (2012) derive in a dynamic model that climate
mitigation is more efficient for both North and South.
3 Specifically, it is explained that a ‘self-enforcing agreement is credible in the sense
that, given the participation decisions of others and the requirements of the treaty,
no signatory can gain by withdrawing and no non-signatory can gain by acceding;
signatories cannot gain collectively by changing their aggregate abatement; and
no non-signatory can gain by changing its decision to abate’ (Barrett, 2005: 1468).
4 Decision 1/CP.17 on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action reads: ‘The Confer-
ence of the Parties . . . decides to launch a process to develop a protocol, another
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention
applicable to all Parties . . .; decides that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Dur-
ban Platform for Enhanced Action shall complete its work as early as possible
but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, another legal instrument or
an agreed outcome with legal force at the twenty-first session of the Conference
of the Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020’ (see
UNFCCC, 2011).
5 Feedback effects from the costs of climate policies on the chosen policy target are
discussed in Tavoni et al. (2012).
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available time period. Hence, the current challenge is to propose a distri-
bution of a given greenhouse gas budget across all the nations, which has
the potential to be generally acceptable. It is important that such a proposal
does not involve too high a negotiation cost, because this might prevent a
deal to be agreed on within the remaining time period.
To provide useful guidelines for a feasible climate negotiation process,
equity principles appear to be very relevant.6 These principles are likely
to work as focal points during negotiations, which decrease negotiation
costs substantially and may also be suitable for raising political acceptance
(see Lange et al., 2007).7 I argue that the main reason to concentrate on focal
points in international climate policy is negotiation costs. So far, there is not
a generally agreed procedure or concept of how to use equity principles
in climate policy. What is needed is a plausible mechanism to transform
abstract principles into a form which is ready to be used in international
climate negotiations. This is where the present paper aims to make a con-
tribution. This paper proposes a concrete solution for international burden
sharing, which includes egalitarian aspects but does not impose equal shar-
ing of resources as a first principle. Moreover, the proposed fairness rule
also comprises cost-sharing aspects, which appear to be crucial for political
acceptance, without declaring political constraints to be on the level of the
principles.
The provided solution is based on a broad set of principles but becomes
very simple in the end; it allows the debate to eventually concentrate on
a single variable and two parameters. The achieved reduction of com-
plexity is aimed at supporting the political decision-making process. The
paper starts with an approach modelling the costs of climate negotiations
in order to motivate the need for generally acceptable negotiation items.
It then provides a brief evaluation of the most relevant equity principles.
As a novel aspect, it stresses the fact that development is a dynamic pro-
cess, which cannot be evaluated in a purely static framework. I argue that
changes in technology and carbon efficiency must have an impact on the
general policy assessment. Starting from broadly acceptable first principles,
the paper derives a simple equation to calculate individual and country
emission budgets. By a variation of the remaining parameters, different
solutions can be evaluated. For illustrative purposes and possible practical
use, calculations on the country levels are given in the final part.
The contribution is related to Lange et al. (2007) putting forward
the importance of equity principles in climate policy and Mattoo and
Subramanian (2010) who present theory and practice of climate policy
burden sharing, mainly focusing on ability to pay and efficiency princi-
ples. Rose et al. (1998), Konow (2003) and Grasso (2007) provide useful
6 The 1987 Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer is often seen as a successful imple-
mentation of equity principles in an international environmental issue, but it is
obvious that the costs and benefits have also been more favorable for reaching an
agreement.
7 It can also be argued that international negotiators have to consider the fairness
preferences of their voters at home, but this will not be a focus of this paper.
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overviews on general equity principles; Cazorla and Toman (2000), Metz
(2000), Grasso (2007), Page (2008) and Johansson-Stenman and Konow
(2010) apply the principles to climate and environmental economics.
Contributions stressing egalitarian principles are BASIC (2011) and
Bode (2004). Other studies are mainly concerned with political con-
straints caused by adaptation policies and a lack of compliance and
motivation; see Bosetti and Frankel (2009), McKibbin et al. (2010) and
Gersbach and Winkler (2011), who present a broad calculation of the
economic efforts required to achieve specific climate commitments.
Blanford et al. (2008) show the importance of newly emerging economies,
Bretschger and Valente (2011) derive the dynamic consequences of climate
change, while Lange et al. (2010) remind us that in the negotiations, equity
principles can also be used for selfish reasons. Finally, the model is linked
to international negotiation theory (see Odell, 2006), where primarily
strategies and specific negotiations skills are analyzed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the social optimum when negotiation costs are non-negligible and based
on a structured approach. Section 3 discusses the most relevant equity
principles. In section 4 I apply the principles to a climate policy proposal.
Section 5 presents the country allocation results of the proposal. Section 6
concludes.
2. Social optimum
2.1. Two-step procedure
To achieve a (world) social optimum with carbon emissions,8 one has to
consider two distinct maximization problems. The first is to determine opti-
mum carbon abatement applying standard utilitarian principles. Efficiency
is achieved by equalizing marginal cost and marginal benefits of abate-
ment. The 2◦C target of climate policy can be interpreted as a (broadly
accepted) solution to this maximization problem. Based on the temperature
target, science results have to determine the associated world carbon bud-
get available in the future; see Meinshausen et al. (2009) for a calculation.
The second maximization problem consists in finding an agreeable
treaty, realizing the potential net benefit of climate policies. Such an agree-
ment is by no means automatically reached, even when the aggregate
benefit is very large. Quite to the contrary, when assessing the previous
conferences of the parties of the UNFCCC, negotiation costs have even
proved to be enormous. A binding constraint is the limited time avail-
able for further negotiations. Hence, the second optimization problem is to
obtain a generally acceptable climate deal, given the heterogenous inter-
ests of countries and the transaction costs of climate negotiations. The
present paper takes the target world carbon budget as given and presents
conditions under which a policy to achieve such a budget appear to be
more easily acceptable by all the countries.
8 Throughout the paper, I use the term ‘carbon’ as a short expression for all the
greenhouse gases.
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Formally, I study the process of finding an allocation of emission budgets
Z j for countries j = 1, 2, . . . , N , i.e., a series
Z1, Z2, Z3, . . . Z N . (1)
In order to be a part of the set of feasible solutions, an allocation (1) has
to obey several restrictions. Denoting world target carbon budget (which
is compatible with the 2◦C target) by Z¯ , net benefits of an international
climate agreement by B, and negotiation costs by Q, the restrictions read
N∑
j=1
Z j ≤ Z¯ (2)
B − Q > 0 (3)
B j − Q j > 0, ∀ j. (4)
While (2) is the world emission quantity constraint, (3) and (4) express
that net benefits must exceed costs of negotiation both at the global and
the country level. As I did not spell out preferences, net benefits in (4) may
also include altruism towards low-developed countries9 and future gen-
erations; (4) corresponds to the assumption of ‘international paretianism’
of Posner and Weisbach (2012), but additionally includes negotiation costs.
In the following I focus on condition (3) which, with given B, can only be
met when Q does not grow too large. Accordingly, the next section pro-
poses a theory of negotiation costs identifying possible ways to reduce Q
so that (3) can be satisfied with given B. The following sections will deal
with proposals likely to satisfy (3) and (4).
To study the issue in a systematic way, I need to make assumptions about
the mechanics of the negotiation process. Notably, I have to specify negoti-
ation technology and associated cost, which I present as a novel approach
in the following subsection.
2.2. Negotiation costs
I argue that negotiation costs Q are transaction costs and assume them to
depend on the number of negotiating parties, the number and complexity
of the negotiation items, the heterogeneity of interests between the par-
ties, and the negotiation setting which determines how parties interact
during negotiations. Often-used settings at international climate negotia-
tions are plenary sessions, specialized sessions, country group meetings
and bilateral talks. Experience of the climate negotiations shows that many
decisions taken in specialized working groups or plenary sessions are
solidly prepared in bilateral talks. Accordingly, the following approach to
modeling negotiation costs uses the costs of bilateral talks as an element.
I first look at an extreme case, i.e., the maximum negotiation cost to
obtain an agreement, and then discuss various ways to reduce the costs. If
negotiations of a specific item like abatement targets require going through
9 This option is further explored in Anthoff and Tol (2010).
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all possible bilateral meetings with N different parties, a total of (N 2 − N )/2
meetings are necessary, which shows the disproportional impact of the
number of parties. Of course, a realistic setting helps to omit part of these
meetings; I will discuss below which items are most likely to be successful
in this respect. To obtain costs, the number of meetings has to be multiplied
by average meeting costs, which depend positively on the number and
the complexity of the negotiation items and the heterogeneity of parties’
interests.
Theory has to focus on the fact that it usually takes several negotia-
tion rounds before convergence between the involved parties is obtained. I
label the different negotiation rounds by t = 1, 2, 3, . . . and express nego-
tiation costs in t by M(t) = M¯ · V (t) where M¯ is a negotiation-specific
constant and V a convergence factor, which increases between the rounds
but converges to a steady state; an agreement requires V (t + 1) = V (t).10
Typically, a climate policy negotiation document includes different sub-
items which are sequentially agreed on by the parties. The dynamic process
of V depends on the speed by which parties are able to agree on these
sub-items. Formally, I assume that V evolves according to
V (t + 1) = (1 − φ) V (t) + χ [V (t)]ξ (5)
where 0 < φ, ξ, χ < 1. Expression (5) allows discussion of the different
dynamic elements of negotiation costs. The ‘completion’ parameter φ
denotes the share of negotiation sub-items which has been agreed on in
the previous round. The ‘step’ rate χ determines the increase of V between
the negotiation rounds; if ξ = 1 the growth rate of V equals χ − φ, i.e.,
it diminishes fast with low χ , meaning a fast decrease of negotiation com-
plexity. As an example, negotiations concerning technical issues like carbon
capture and sequestration may decrease rapidly in complexity once the
technicalities are well understood. The marginal impact of χ [V (t)]ξ on
V (t + 1) decreases with rising V which results in convergence. The con-
vergence term ξ is low when additional negotiation rounds, increasing V,
allow for rapid convergence; when it is high, convergence is slow. An exam-
ple with little convergence and hence high ξ has been the negotiation on
technology transfers under the Bali action plan where country positions
remained controversial for several years. The growth rate of V is given
by χ [V (t)]ξ−1 − φ so that V converges to V ∗ = (χ/φ)1/(1−ξ) and aggregate
negotiation costs Q for a specific negotiation item are given by
Q = M¯(N
2 − N )
2
(
χ
φ
)1/(1−ξ)
. (6)
It becomes clear from (6) that high specific cost M¯ , a high step rate χ and a
large convergence parameter ξ entail high negotiation cost Q, while a large
completion share φ decreases cost.
10 When being strict, I have to formally assume the convergence criterion reading
V (t + 1)(1 − ε) = V (t) where 0 < ε < 1 which guarantees finite convergence.
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Expression (6) allows us to analyze different negotiation items like abate-
ments targets or burden-sharing rules with respect to their impact on Q
in (6). The number of parties N is given at the United Nations but the
(quadratic) term in (6) is based on the assumed complete bilateralism. Any
items reducing the number of necessary bilateral meetings thus decrease
the impact of N on cost Q. Specifically, if an item is largely acceptable,
countries may decide to negotiate in groups (like the G77), which reduces
the number of necessary talks substantially. We then have a theory on bilat-
eral talks between groups. Besides the obvious effects of M¯ , χ and φ, it is
the convergence parameter ξ which is of special interest, because it has a
disproportional impact on Q. A very complex item can cause slow conver-
gence, i.e., a large number of additional negotiation rounds. This happens
with a value of ξ close to unity, increasing total negotiation cost Q to a very
large amount.
2.3. Negotiation items
I now look at different possible negotiation items and burden-sharing pro-
posals at international climate negotiations with regard to the crucial model
parameters N and ξ in (6).
• A pledge and review procedure for country abatement targets reveals
countries’ willingness to participate but has produced very unequal
results between the countries. It is unclear to many, specifically to the
non-pledging countries, how the offers compare between the coun-
tries, especially in terms of economic costs of climate policies. Recent
climate conferences have proved that countries do not assess that
the process generates a fair burden sharing; it has not produced suf-
ficient convergence so far, indicating high ξ . Hence, the procedure
seems to imply unfavorable values for N and ξ and thus a high Q.
• A second strategy is to include all the aspects determining the
consequences of the pledges, i.e., to negotiate about economic cost,
trade positions, money transfers, technology development and more.
This increases the number of items drastically, which is not a very
promising approach to bring about more favorable values for N
and ξ .
• The third strategy is on a very different level, proposing equity prin-
ciples for the allocation of the carbon budget to countries which are
generally accepted and considered to be fair. According to (6), the
lower the number and the complexity of the negotiations items, the
lower the values of N and ξ become, which improves the prospects
of finding an agreement. Consequently, the paper proposes a burden-
sharing rule based on a very low number of equity principles. This
is according to the requirement for low values of N and ξ, i.e., low
negotiation cost.
There are more possible variants but the paper moves on to the next top-
ics for the sake of brevity. To conclude, the aim should be to propose a
solution for burden sharing which is broadly considered as fair, clear and
simple. This appears most promising when restrictions (3) and (4) have to
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be satisfied. Equity principles are a natural point of departure for such a
reasoning. That in the end each and every country is willing to agree to
such a climate deal might also imply some punishment for non-signatory
countries. Specifically, if the condition (4) cannot be fulfilled without sanc-
tioning non-signatories, trade sanctions could be put forward as a possible
compliance mechanism, like under the Montreal Protocol. Trade sanctions
may have undesirable effects but be compatible with free trade agreements
in the case of border adjustments with obligations to buy allowances. The
paper does not elaborate on this point but concentrates on equity principles
as a means to reduce negotiation costs Q in the following.
3. Equity principles
In his original contribution, Schelling (1980) introduces focal points as solu-
tions to a problem which are natural, special or relevant. He explains that
focal points are highly useful in negotiations because they are part of
everybody’s general expectations and suitable to build trust among the
negotiating partners. In this section, equity principles are introduced as
possible focal points for climate negotiations. I argue that these principles
are a major means to decrease negotiation complexity and, hence, nego-
tiation cost. I discuss and evaluate those principles which appear to be
especially relevant for climate policy and useful for the international cli-
mate negotiation process. The latter is closely related to simplicity and
intuition but also to verification, which is not given when rules depend on
results from (complex) numerical models (see, e.g., Anthoff and Tol, 2010).
The discussion is focused on the requirements of current climate policy
and thus is not exhaustive with regard to the principles discussed in the
literature. The paper is on climate mitigation policies; adaptation is only
mentioned on the side.
The Egalitarian Principle in the form of an equal right to atmospheric
resources has recently attracted considerable interest (see Bode, 2004;
BASIC, 2011). However, despite its attributes of simplicity and immediate
intuition, it has major drawbacks. It is conceivable to argue that, if it were
applied to the atmosphere, it should also be applied to the other natural
(and possibly manmade) resources, which is not a generally accepted view.
Markets and policies usually have different objectives; countries allocate
their own resources in a different manner. Hence, what is not the standard
principle on a national level can hardly be the main guideline on an inter-
national level. Even more important, an equal use of atmospheric resources
does not consider the context of the use. Notably, with the increasing
availability of carbon-efficient technologies, carbon emissions become less
imminent for human wellbeing and economic development compared to
earlier periods. The often referred to right to develop has thus to focus on
those factors which are crucial for development; among these, carbon emis-
sions are much less imminent than, for example, capital, education and
knowledge investments (see Bretschger et al., 2011). In addition, technical
progress makes resource use more productive over time, so that – under
equity considerations – emissions have to be evaluated in the context of
the technology level. Nevertheless, the Egalitarian Principle can be applied
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in the sense that the equity rules of burden sharing should be applied on a
per capita level (but in an adjusted form). Hence, every individual is treated
in the same way, but, and this is crucial, with consideration of the context
of its actions. The principle should be interpreted to allow for an ‘equitable
access to sustainable development’,11 which crucially depends on the avail-
ability of technologies, and in particular on carbon-efficient technologies,
but not on absolute emission levels.
The Ability to Pay Principle requires the future allocation of carbon emis-
sions to be inversely related to the ability to pay for emission reduction.
It is closely related to the countries’ capacity to contribute to solving the
climate problem.12 It involves a redistribution of income, which is an issue
in any policy context. The specific problem to consider with climate pol-
icy is that incomes are in general positively correlated not only with past
but also with current carbon emissions, so that the costs to reduce carbon
emissions are also related to income. Therefore, the Ability to Pay Principle
may stand in contrast to the Efficiency Principle, which requires maximizing
total surplus or, more precisely, minimizing the costs of carbon policy (see
Rose et al., 1998; Konow, 2003: 1205). But note that the distribution of the
costs of a global policy is not exclusively an efficiency but also an equity
concern. The efficiency view is concerned with total costs becoming min-
imal, while the equity view argues that these costs should be distributed
in a fair way, which is the way it is used in this paper. Accordingly, I will
use the term Cost Sharing Principle below. A strong focus on the distribution
of cost is reflected in the often quoted Grandfathering Rules, allocating the
emission rights in proportion to current pollution.
Fairness and efficiency are often considered to be at odds but an appro-
priate policy can alleviate the conflict; the result of the present paper may
serve as an example. The Ability to Pay Principle is also related to the
Polluter Pays Principle, which assigns the burden of the policy proportion-
ately to actual pollution. Both rules appear to be especially well suited for
climate adaptation policies, in particular when defining the payments for
funds used for adaptation measures. The Need Principle requires distribu-
tive justice with the aim of satisfaction of the basic needs of all individuals,
which may include the use of the atmosphere.
The Desert Principle identifies factors justifying higher individual claims,
in general on economic income and wealth (see Konow, 2003: 1207). From
the different factors discussed in literature it emerges that differences
attributable to effort are generally considered to be fair. In the context of
climate policy, efforts relate to all contributions, enabling a delinking of
income and welfare from carbon use. It thus appears to be a desert when
advancing the productivity of atmospheric resource use by developing
11 The term was officially used for an ad hoc working group under Long-term Coop-
erative Action 2012; in economics, the term sustainability is mostly interpreted as
‘weak sustainability’ which means that aggregate productive capacities have to
be preserved for future generations.
12 Put differently, the principles says ‘the more one can afford to contribute, the more
one should,’ which is how most countries organize the financing of public goods,
e.g., by progressive income taxation.
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carbon-efficient technologies and letting the rest of the world benefit
through international knowledge provision. Some benefits of technology
improvements are internalized, but this is by far not a sufficient reward;
otherwise the climate problem could easily be solved. Besides our focus on
the general technology level, this is a second dynamic ingredient which
appears to be crucial for economic development. Many climate studies
do not especially consider economic dynamics, while the present paper
argues that dynamics are crucial when analyzing the access to a devel-
opment which both decreases carbon emissions and increases welfare. We
disregard further principles mentioned in literature for the sake of clarity
and brevity. Specifically, possible political constraints are not considered
as first principles. Also, more complicated statements based on numerical
simulation models are not included. Finally, all the countries (including the
less-developed economies) are included in the analysis.
When applying these principles to international carbon policy, several
side conditions have to be settled. First, especially with international trade,
one has to determine whether producers or consumers are liable for the
consequences of resource use. The standards of income accounting and
international law suggest that producers are responsible, but economics
shows that, also in this case, consumers carry (part of) the burden of cli-
mate policy through (higher) prices of (imported) goods. Another issue is
whether we should apply the same principles for distributing the burden
in mitigation and adaptation policies. The discussion suggests that with
adaptation we should refer more to the ability to pay and the polluter pays
approach but the present paper is concerned with mitigation policy. As
regards timing, we consider the period starting with Historic Responsibil-
ity (where the period of ‘excusable ignorance’ stops)13 and ending in the
middle of the 21st century, because climate sciences have calculated feasi-
ble world carbon budgets up to this point in time (see Meinshausen et al.,
2009). I will calculate country carbon budgets and not time paths, because
these can be better optimized on the country level. Also, in order to opti-
mize costs, countries should be allowed to internationally trade their initial
emission entitlements. Additional services in land use and forest manage-
ment may be included in calculating the entitlements, but this is not a focus
here. I argue that responsibility also includes sharing resources among
a country’s population so that we count population of a country at the
beginning of the ‘responsibility’ period.
4. Application to climate policy
4.1. Using the principles
There are many equity principles and different ways to apply them in cli-
mate policy proposals. The purpose of this subsection is to select some
of the most accepted principles according to the literature (see, e.g.,
Lange et al., 2007; Mattoo and Subramanian, 2010). In the next subsection I
13 The most obvious starting date is 1990 but the calculations of the paper can also
be applied with a different year.
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will complement them with a dynamic perspective which is crucial for the
long-run sustainability aspects. The main guideline of the following con-
sideration is to find a combination of equity principles which yields a clear
and simple allocation rule for international carbon budgets. This is done in
order to find a solution to the problem of (too) high negotiation cost, as ana-
lyzed above. I take that by the agreement on the Durban platform all the
countries are included in the analysis. In addition, by the Cancun agree-
ments, I assume that the 2◦C target is confirmed. One can then adopt from
natural science results what the remaining world carbon budget will be.
Naturally, my calculation method could also be used for alternative carbon
budgets and/or temperature targets.
The Ability to Pay Principle is included to derive the budgets as a mea-
sure of purchasing power, mainly for carbon-efficient technologies. The
Cost Sharing Principle is employed to reflect the distribution of abatement
costs (not to guarantee an efficient policy, this is done by allowing for per-
mit trade). The Desert Principle is used for the provision of carbon-saving
technical progress. The Polluter Pays Principle is included in the sense that
past emissions are deducted from the overall carbon budget, possibly with
a discount, depending on the valuation of historic responsibility. In the
long-run steady state, one can assume that every individual will obtain an
equal share of atmospheric resources, but this has no impact on my deriva-
tion, because I look at the transition of the economy towards sustainable
development.
4.2. Economic dynamics
An important but so far neglected issue for an equitable solution in cli-
mate policy is the impact of economic dynamics, in particular technological
development. When applying equity principles to climate policies one
should compare like with like. Specifically, carbon emissions should be eval-
uated with respect to the technical opportunities available at the time of
emission.
Regarding carbon saving technologies, recent changes have indeed been
remarkable. According to World Bank (2012) data, the average annual
growth rate of world CO2 emission intensity (global CO2 emissions per
constant $ of world GDP) for the period 1980–2008 amounts to −1.42 per
cent. This means that, on average, the necessity to emit a ton of CO2 to
produce a unit of output decreases by more than 1 per cent each year,
which is respectable given the long time horizon of climate policy. The
average annual growth rate of world CO2 emission intensity per capita
even amounts to −2.9 per cent.14 World emission intensity and the respec-
tive growth rates are depicted in figure 1. Relating this finding to a fair
burden allocation suggests that later developing countries have the advan-
tage to have access to technologies with higher carbon efficiency, due to the
diffusion of these technologies on world markets.
14 This makes it clear that to motivate the use of fossil fuels in terms of the ‘right to
development’ or the ‘basic needs’ as equity principles will lose its attractiveness
in the future.
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Figure 1. World emission intensity 1980–2008
Source: World Bank (2012).
4.3. Fairness index
The different principles are used to build a ‘fairness’ index F , which is
a weighting index for fairness, used as the main ingredient to determine
fair carbon budgets; a higher F will yield a higher budget in the follow-
ing. F depends on four variables: the (inverse of the) Ability to Pay A,
the abatement cost parameter C , the (individual or country) technology
contribution x , and the general technology development X. All variables
are measured for an individual i at the beginning of the considered time
period. An important methodological issue is how to combine these four
factors mathematically, which ultimately determines their weight in the
index. A broadly used technique is the weighted average, which relies on
the (simple) arithmetic weighted average of the (normalized) variables.
When the weights are the same for all the variables we get the so-called
‘equally weighted averages’. The procedure is simple but the linearity
implies constant substitutability among the different criteria, which is a
strong assumption for international climate policy. It implies that a country
can compensate (even extreme) deviations from the mean in one variable
in exchange for other variables at a constant ratio. A more suitable proce-
dure is to use the multiplicative form between the variables and define the
weights in the exponents. In the present case, this leads to:
Fi = Aαi · Cβi · xi γ · X δi (7)
where 0 < α, β, γ, δ < 1 determine how the index F increases when a
variable on the right-hand side grows. Because the exponents are below
unity, the index grows less than proportional with the single variables.
For the following application, we measure each of the core variables by
the best available indicator, knowing well that a certain degree of rough-
ness is unavoidable with the procedure (in fact, with any procedure). In
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Table 1. Measuring the variables
Ability to pay Cost sharing Techn. contrib. Techn. develop.
Variable Ai Ci xi Xi
Measure
Li
Yi
Ei
Li
Yi
Ei
Ei
Li
concrete terms, we capture A by the inverse of income Y per capita (L),
the mitigation cost burden by emissions E per capita L , the contribution
to technology development by output Y per emission E , and the context
of general technology development by emissions E per capita L . This last
measure needs further explanation. To take initial emissions per capita as
an indicator for future carbon technology development (which for obvious
reasons is not directly measurable) relies on the assumption that the func-
tion of carbon efficiency development is monotonous. Put differently, the
measure is meaningful when we assume that technical efficiency of carbon
use is improving steadily, as has been the case in the past (see the previous
subsection). Then, a person/country with high pollution in the beginning
and a decreasing carbon profile is different from a person/country with
low pollution in the beginning and rising emissions. With regard to carbon
use, the first person/country has unambiguously less technical opportuni-
ties than the second. The measurement of the variables is represented in
table 1.
Using this specification we get
Fi =
(
Li
Yi
)α ( Ei
Li
)β+δ ( Yi
Ei
)γ
= Li α−β−δ Eβ+δ−γi Y γ−αi . (8)
In a non-growing (static) economy, the technology development param-
eter is zero, i.e., δ = 0. Then, applying the equal weight method to the
parameters in the exponent, we set α = β = γ. Interestingly, this yields
Fi = 1, which is exactly the egalitarian solution with equal weights for
every individual, like in BASIC (2011). But note that the result is not using
equal carbon space as something like a first principle; the outcome emerges
due to the exactly balancing effects of three (real) first principles; namely
ability to pay, abatement costs and technology contribution.
However, I argue that the considered economies are inherently dynamic,
mainly driven by technical progress. Hence, taking δ > 0 and applying the
equal weight rule to all the four variables, we have α = β = γ = δ in order
to obtain
Fi =
(
Ei
Li
)α
. (9)
This expression has many interesting aspects. It reduces the highly com-
plex problem of burden sharing in international climate policy to one single
variable (Ei/Li ) and a unique parameter (α, with α = β = γ = δ ). It offers
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a close link to natural sciences and, moreover, an easy calculation method
for the emission budgets. Importantly, with the link to (initial) emissions it
opens the door to (possible) political acceptance, much like the grandfather-
ing rules used with past carbon policy, without using political constraints
as first principle. The derived relationship is nonlinear, so that the impact
of emissions on the index fades with increasing emissions. Nonlinearity
is even high, because, with the obvious restriction α + β + γ + δ = 1, we
have α = 0.25.
Following the discussion on negotiation cost, the positive attributes of
the simple formula (9) are as follows: (i) it is ethically defensible, (ii) it is
likely to cut negotiation cost enormously, and (iii) it has no negative impact
on market efficiency when carbon trading is possible after the first alloca-
tion. Note that the simplicity of (9) is due to the used weights which are
equal. If the assumption is disputed, an increase in negotiation costs is the
inevitable consequence.
4.4. Budget calculation
Individual allocation
Each individual i receives an emission budget Bi according to the indi-
vidual fairness index Fi and the total amount of entitlements Z available,
according to
Bi = Fi∑L
i=1 Fi
· Z . (10)
Country allocation
Let us define the population share of country j as m j (t) = L j (t)/L(t) and
use N for the number of countries. Each country receives an emission bud-
get Z j according to the weighting index Fj (reflecting the fair index for
country j), the country share m j , and the total amount of entitlements Z
available in total, so that
Z j = m j · Fj∑N
j=1 m j · Fj
· Z . (11)
4.5. Historic responsibility
So far we have not distinguished between different time periods. The
whole period to consider starts with historic responsibility and is assumed
to end in 2050, because current budget calculations provided by natural
sciences end at that point in time. Because of natural decay of greenhouse
gases and the absence of legal obligations in the past we might value past
carbon use differently from future use. For practical reasons, we will distin-
guish between a first period, starting with the date of historic responsibility
up to the point where the most recent statistics are available, and a second
period, from that point in time until 2050. For the budget calculation, we
assume the countries to receive entitlements according to the fairness index
as derived above but now posit that actually used emissions in the first
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period may be discounted with a factor 0 < θ < 1. In the concrete calcula-
tions, we will compare carbon budgets for the responsibility values θ = 1.0;
0.8; 0.5; and 0.
5. Country results
5.1. Assumptions
To provide concrete information about the derived fairness equation, this
section calculates country carbon budgets, using the fairness index F
and a specific set of assumptions. Of course, the general concept equally
holds when different parameter specifications and time periods are more
politically acceptable. The assumptions for the calculations here are:
• Start of (historic) responsibility: 1990
• First (‘responsibility’) period; 1990–2008 (1990 is the starting date of
international climate policy; for 2008 the last international data on
carbon use are available)
• Second (‘carbon budget’) period: 2008–2050 (feasible world carbon
budgets were calculated up to 2050)
• Total carbon budget Z for 1990–2050: (i) ‘Variant 50 per cent’, i.e.,
carbon emissions corresponding to a probability of 50 per cent of
exceeding 2◦C, and (ii) ‘Variant 33 per cent’, i.e., the equivalent for
a probability of 33 per cent, based on Meinshausen et al. (2009) who
cover 2000–2050, plus carbon emissions 1990–2000, yielding 1,640
gigatons in total for ‘Variant 50 per cent’ and 1,360 gigatons for
‘Variant 33 per cent’.
• Calculation of Ei/Li : per capita carbon emission data for 1990 as
given by World Bank (2012).
• α = 0.25 (= β = γ = δ)
• Population size: 1990 values
• Valuation of emissions in the ‘responsibility’ period: scenarios for
different levels of θ ranging from θ = 1 (full responsibility) to θ → 0
(no responsibility).
5.2. Budgets
Tables 2–4 show the carbon budgets for 2008–2050 for selected countries and
four levels of historic responsibility, given by different values of θ . The
tables contain two sections, with the ‘Variant 50 per cent’ (1,640 gigatons
in total) given on the left and the lower ‘Variant 33 per cent’ (1,360 giga-
tons) on the right. Table 2 contains the total budget, table 3 the budget per
capita (using 2008 population values), and table 4 the average budget per
capita per year.
By inspection of the tables it becomes clear that the shares (specifically
the budgets per capita) are not very unequal between the different coun-
tries. Late-developing countries and high past polluters receive relatively
lower budgets. Less-developed economies have the possibility to increase
per capita emissions compared to current emissions, at least in a first time
period. The common issue for higher developed countries is that they have
to cut emissions compared to previous levels, although in a differentiated
manner.
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Table 2. Total budget (period 2008–2050 in gigatons)
50% probability 33% probability
Country
name θ = 1 θ = 0.8 θ = 0.5 θ → 0 θ = 1 θ = 0.8 θ = 0.5 θ → 0
China 294.36 287.08 277.96 266.21 230.95 223.21 213.98 202.81
India 195.84 185.50 172.55 155.86 158.71 147.71 134.61 118.74
United
States
26.20 43.12 64.31 91.62 4.38 22.38 43.82 69.80
Indonesia 43.12 40.92 38.15 34.58 34.89 32.54 29.74 26.35
Russian
Fed.
32.33 36.07 40.74 46.77 21.19 25.17 29.90 35.63
Brazil 36.76 35.14 33.11 30.50 29.49 27.77 25.72 23.24
Japan 29.18 31.24 33.81 37.13 20.34 22.53 25.13 28.29
Mexico 22.02 21.76 21.43 21.01 17.01 16.73 16.41 16.01
Germany 17.88 19.63 21.82 24.64 12.01 13.87 16.09 18.77
Nigeria 19.93 18.71 17.18 15.21 16.30 15.01 13.46 11.59
Bangladesh 17.61 16.42 14.93 13.02 14.51 13.24 11.74 9.92
France 14.88 15.16 15.50 15.95 11.08 11.37 11.73 12.15
United
Kingdom
13.51 14.47 15.67 17.22 9.40 10.43 11.65 13.12
Thailand 14.81 14.45 14.00 13.41 11.61 11.23 10.77 10.22
Turkey 14.07 13.76 13.38 12.87 11.01 10.68 10.28 9.81
Ukraine 12.93 13.42 14.03 14.83 9.40 9.92 10.54 11.29
Vietnam 14.14 13.31 12.27 10.93 11.53 10.65 9.60 8.33
Korea, Rep. 10.22 10.88 11.72 12.80 7.17 7.88 8.72 9.75
Colombia 8.03 7.66 7.19 6.58 6.46 6.06 5.59 5.01
Peru 4.98 4.72 4.39 3.96 4.04 3.76 3.42 3.02
Congo,
D.R.
4.45 4.13 3.73 3.22 3.68 3.34 2.94 2.46
Kenya 4.13 3.86 3.51 3.07 3.40 3.11 2.76 2.34
Australia 2.21 3.22 4.49 6.12 0.75 1.83 3.11 4.66
Nepal 2.68 2.50 2.26 1.96 2.22 2.02 1.78 1.49
Cote
d’Ivoire
2.42 2.27 2.07 1.83 1.99 1.82 1.63 1.39
Uganda 2.28 2.12 1.92 1.66 1.88 1.71 1.51 1.26
Bolivia 1.55 1.47 1.37 1.24 1.25 1.17 1.07 0.94
Cambodia 1.54 1.44 1.30 1.14 1.27 1.16 1.03 0.86
Senegal 1.42 1.33 1.22 1.08 1.17 1.07 0.96 0.82
Norway 1.03 1.08 1.16 1.25 0.73 0.79 0.86 0.95
As can be seen from the tables, historic responsibility matters especially
for the United States, but is also an issue for other countries like Russia or
Japan. The outcome suggests that historic responsibility is likely to be an
important separate negotiation item. Otherwise, results are quite robust,
also with respect to other model parameters.
Note that the values in table 4 are average emission values for the whole
period and not final values for 2050, which makes a big difference. The time
profile is not predetermined by these calculations.
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Table 3. Budget per capita (period 2008–2050 in tons)
50% probability 33% probability
Country
name θ = 1 θ = 0.8 θ = 0.5 θ → 0 θ = 1 θ = 0.8 θ = 0.5 θ → 0
China 219.95 214.51 207.70 198.92 172.57 166.79 159.89 151.54
India 167.25 158.42 147.36 133.11 135.54 126.15 114.96 101.41
United
States
84.78 139.51 208.07 296.46 14.17 72.42 141.80 225.85
Indonesia 179.78 170.57 159.04 144.18 145.44 135.64 123.97 109.84
Russian
Fed.
228.09 254.43 287.42 329.96 149.51 177.53 210.92 251.37
Brazil 188.54 180.24 169.85 156.45 151.28 142.45 131.93 119.19
Japan 228.98 245.10 265.30 291.34 159.59 176.75 197.19 221.95
Mexico 194.10 191.82 188.96 185.27 149.97 147.54 144.65 141.14
Germany 218.84 240.23 267.02 301.55 147.02 169.78 196.89 229.73
Nigeria 125.79 118.10 108.46 96.03 102.92 94.73 84.98 73.16
Bangladesh 118.40 110.42 100.43 87.54 97.55 89.06 78.94 66.69
France 229.33 233.62 238.99 245.92 170.76 175.33 180.76 187.35
United
Kingdom
217.06 232.52 251.88 276.84 151.13 167.58 187.17 210.90
Thailand 214.20 209.00 202.48 194.07 167.98 162.44 155.84 147.85
Turkey 193.46 189.19 183.85 176.96 151.31 146.77 141.37 134.82
Ukraine 281.81 292.52 305.92 323.20 204.84 216.23 229.79 246.23
Vietnam 162.64 153.11 141.17 125.78 132.68 122.54 110.46 95.82
Korea, Rep. 209.01 222.68 239.79 261.85 146.65 161.19 178.51 199.49
Colombia 173.46 165.36 155.21 142.13 139.61 130.99 120.72 108.28
Peru 171.41 162.31 150.91 136.22 138.97 129.28 117.75 103.78
Congo,
D.R.
67.41 62.61 56.61 48.87 55.77 50.67 44.59 37.23
Kenya 101.95 95.20 86.74 75.83 83.89 76.71 68.14 57.77
Australia 98.88 144.18 200.91 274.06 33.61 81.81 139.23 208.78
Nepal 89.61 83.34 75.49 65.37 74.04 67.37 59.43 49.80
Cote
d’Ivoire
122.66 114.88 105.13 92.55 100.62 92.33 82.47 70.51
Uganda 68.19 63.36 57.32 49.53 56.39 51.26 45.14 37.74
Bolivia 155.95 147.86 137.73 124.67 126.25 117.65 107.40 94.98
Cambodia 108.98 101.56 92.28 80.30 89.85 81.96 72.56 61.18
Senegal 114.40 107.20 98.19 86.58 93.78 86.12 77.00 65.96
Norway 210.36 222.04 236.66 255.52 149.50 161.93 176.73 194.66
6. Conclusions
The paper argues that equity principles should be used to reduce the com-
plexity of international climate negotiations. Combining generally agreed
principles and including economic dynamics, I develop a simple rule for
burden sharing in international climate policy. The resulting allocation of
carbon budgets comprises both the egalitarian and the cost distribution
aspect, which both appear to be crucial for political acceptance. The calcu-
lated carbon budgets for the different countries show the absolute values
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Table 4. Average budget per capita per year (period 2008–2050 in tons)
50% probability 33% probability
Country
name θ = 1 θ = 0.8 θ = 0.5 θ → 0 θ = 1 θ = 0.8 θ = 0.5 θ → 0
China 5.24 5.11 4.95 4.74 4.11 3.97 3.81 3.61
India 3.98 3.77 3.51 3.17 3.23 3.00 2.74 2.41
United
States
2.02 3.32 4.95 7.06 0.34 1.72 3.38 5.38
Indonesia 4.28 4.06 3.79 3.43 3.46 3.23 2.95 2.62
Russian
Fed.
5.43 6.06 6.84 7.86 3.56 4.23 5.02 5.99
Brazil 4.49 4.29 4.04 3.73 3.60 3.39 3.14 2.84
Japan 5.45 5.84 6.32 6.94 3.80 4.21 4.69 5.28
Mexico 4.62 4.57 4.50 4.41 3.57 3.51 3.44 3.36
Germany 5.21 5.72 6.36 7.18 3.50 4.04 4.69 5.47
Nigeria 3.00 2.81 2.58 2.29 2.45 2.26 2.02 1.74
Bangladesh 2.82 2.63 2.39 2.08 2.32 2.12 1.88 1.59
France 5.46 5.56 5.69 5.86 4.07 4.17 4.30 4.46
United
Kingdom
5.17 5.54 6.00 6.59 3.60 3.99 4.46 5.02
Thailand 5.10 4.98 4.82 4.62 4.00 3.87 3.71 3.52
Turkey 4.61 4.50 4.38 4.21 3.60 3.49 3.37 3.21
Ukraine 6.71 6.96 7.28 7.70 4.88 5.15 5.47 5.86
Vietnam 3.87 3.65 3.36 2.99 3.16 2.92 2.63 2.28
Korea, Rep. 4.98 5.30 5.71 6.23 3.49 3.84 4.25 4.75
Colombia 4.13 3.94 3.70 3.38 3.32 3.12 2.87 2.58
Peru 4.08 3.86 3.59 3.24 3.31 3.08 2.80 2.47
Congo,
D.R.
1.60 1.49 1.35 1.16 1.33 1.21 1.06 0.89
Kenya 2.43 2.27 2.07 1.81 2.00 1.83 1.62 1.38
Australia 2.35 3.43 4.78 6.53 0.80 1.95 3.31 4.97
Nepal 2.13 1.98 1.80 1.56 1.76 1.60 1.41 1.19
Cote
d’Ivoire
2.92 2.74 2.50 2.20 2.40 2.20 1.96 1.68
Uganda 1.62 1.51 1.36 1.18 1.34 1.22 1.07 0.90
Bolivia 3.71 3.52 3.28 2.97 3.01 2.80 2.56 2.26
Cambodia 2.59 2.42 2.20 1.91 2.14 1.95 1.73 1.46
Senegal 2.72 2.55 2.34 2.06 2.23 2.05 1.83 1.57
Norway 5.01 5.29 5.63 6.08 3.56 3.86 4.21 4.63
and the sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumption on historic
responsibility.
One can extend the discussion to more complex combinations of the dif-
ferent principles and their valuation. The coming political debate might
find reasons to do so. But the simplicity of burden sharing rules have their
clear merits: they can provide well-defined guidelines and, particularly,
help to cut negotiation cost. The present paper finds a rule that respects
that the burden of emission abatement has to be shared, but includes
the other basic principles like the ability to pay for climate policies in an
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equal way. The nonlinear impact of initial emissions per capita on the fair-
ness index smooths the carbon budget differences between the countries,
which guides the way towards a long-term future with an equal sharing of
atmospheric resources.
It has recently been argued that principles and indicators can provide
insight, but no magic formula. Hence, to be precise, we stress that there
is nothing ‘magic’ about the proposed solution, but something potentially
useful for current climate negotiations: a benchmark (and maybe even
a blueprint) for a highly complicated decision-making process towards
an acceptable outcome for international climate policy. What is needed
is a convincing plan to reconcile the opposing views of high- and low-
developed countries, which has to find a balance between egalitarian and
efficiency aspects of climate policies. There might be valuable alternatives
to the present solution. But if an agreement is to be reached soon, the debate
has now definitely to shift from all the issues which are not promising to
things that may work in the end.
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